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THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
SCHOLARSHIP
Steven D. Smith*
Professor Steinberg's book review is both an argument about the
meaning of the religion clauses and an example of the type of literature that we know as historical constitutional scholarship. Readers of
law reviews will typically take the second quality for granted and will
focus on the specific argument. But I think we will be able to appreciate that argument more fully-both its strengths and its limitationsif we pause to reflect on the sort of literature this is.1
I.

CONSTrrUTIONAL HISTORY IN THE LAw REVIEWs

Historical constitutional scholarship is a genre unto itself. Measured against the product of professional historians, it often seems a
bit shabby. The reason, I think, is notjust that law professors typically
have more training in and instinct for advocacy than historical research. More importantly, the genre's special character-and its frequent deficiency as scholarship-reflects the fact that it is not merely
academic scholarship; almost invariably it is in service of a different,
more practical, perhaps nobler purpose. Constitutional scholarship
serves to construct and maintain the constitutive stories that serve to
guide a community by providing it with a sense of its identity and
character.
* Robert and Marion Short Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I thank
Professor Steinberg both for his thoughtful book review and for his suggestion that I
write a response to it.
1 Although he briefly addresses the "anti-theory" part of my book, Professor
Steinberg indicates that he is primarily interested in the historical argument; consequenty, I will limit this response to the historical debate. I have expanded on the
'anti-theory" argument elsewhere, for example, Steven D. Smith, Is a Coherent Theory of
Religious Freedom Possible?, 15 CONST. Comm. 73 (1998), and have, I hope, avoided
some misconceptions that the book seems to have generated. For example, I do not

claim-and never understood myself to have claimed-that there can be an "infinite
number" of "equally plausible" interpretations of religious freedom; nor do I think
that the inevitable reliance on background premises in itself makes a theory a "bad

theory."
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More specifically, constitutional law professors are usually in the
business of fashioning historical accounts that will generate prescriptions to courts on central or culture-defining matters. In the current
jurisprudential climate, this prescriptive purpose means that history
will be useful to constitutional scholars only if it culminates in "principles" that can be applied by courts to produce results that are attractive under current views and values. A constitutional story without a
principle is like ajoke without a punch line, or a Sunday School lesson
without a moral. Not surprisingly, when law professors (or historians
writing for similar purposes) recount our nation's history, the stories
they tell almost always wind their way to some very attractive
2
principle.
It's not that anyone is out to fabricate nice stories out of nothing.
Professors usually have more integrity than that, or more commitment
to "the facts." And in any case, a purely concocted story would be
vulnerable, because in order to serve its function as guiding authority,
a story needs to be... well, not true, exactly, but close enough to truth
that it can be counted as true for practical and public purposes. So all
in all, the effect of law professors' community-constituting purpose on
the history they write is complicated and subtle. Tacit presumptions
work their way into the enterprise. Standards of proof are accordingly
relaxed or, conversely, for scholarship that subverts an attractive story
or principle, tightened. Arguments that might seem puzzling or simply pointless if we were merely trying to figure out "what really happened" acquire a commanding respectability. The familiar "level of
generality" phenomenon is exploited to craft grand principles that
3
can be attributed to framers who are not in any position to protest.
Through this process, exhilarating fictions may be elevated into
fact. If a story could be and should be true, that may be good enough.
Hence the authority of Justice Brandeis's celebrated concurrence in
Whitney v. California,4 with its reverberating rhetoric ascribing to
" It] hose who won our independence" lofty liberal commitments that
historians have found hard to corroborate. Hence the continuing appeal in some quarters of the story told in Everson v. Board of Education.5
2 To avoid misunderstanding, let me quickly acknowledge that the study and
writing of history will always be done for some purpose, just as it will always be done
from some perspective. See infra note 12. But some purposes will be best served by
achieving as accurate an understanding as we can of what happened in the past, while
other purposes will not necessarily be best served in that way.
3 In the course of this essay I will mention more concrete instances of these
features.

4 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
5 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Professor Steinberg's book review has all the marks of the genre.
His concern to develop a historical interpretation that will guide
courts to desirable results is manifest throughout the review. And he
explicitly assumes that in order to perform this function history must
yield a "principle" of religious freedom, because without such a principle judicial action would be "illegitimate."6 These constraints
powerfully shape Steinberg's historical analysis.
The overall logic of the argument combines a could have with a
must have to produce a did. Americans of the founding generation,
Professor Steinberg argues, could have agreed on a principle of "religious choice." 7 They must have agreed on some substantive principle
of religious freedom (though the necessity generating the "must," it
will tum out, is more ours than theirs). Therefore the founders did
adopt a constitutional principle of religious choice. Statements made
at the time by people like Madison-statements expressing a different
and much more limited understanding of what the religion clauses
were supposed to do 8-are relegated to the background (as they
nearly always are in modern legal scholarship or judicial opinions).
Also relegated to the background are the circumstances of the timeI will discuss them shortly-that would have made it eminently sensible for the First Congress simply to put a widely accepted jurisdictional arrangement in writing, and that would have made it next to
impossible for Congress to attempt a sort of deliberative conference
culminating in a statement of the best principle or the true meaning
of religious freedom.
The necessity-driven quality of Professor Steinberg's account is
strikingly manifest in his eloquent conclusion. There Steinberg acknowledges that the "religious choice" principle for which he has so
strenuously argued might not have been adopted by the framers after
all; even so, he immediately adds, we must believe that "the religion
clauses enacted some substantive principle or set of principles." 9 His
insistence on the point is intriguing. After all, Steinberg's argument is
6 David E. Steinberg, Gardeningat Night: Religion and Choice, 74 N.D. L. REV. 987,
989 (1999) (reviewing STEVEN D. SMrrH, FOREORDAINED FALURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITrTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

(1995)). The same assumption

leads Professor Steinberg to assert that my argument against the possibility of a satisfactory principle leads "inexorably" to judicial withdrawal from the field, even if I
disclaim that conclusion. See id. at 1012. For myself, I doubt this inexorability be-

cause I am not persuaded of the axiom thatjudicial review must be "principled." See,
e.g., Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 497
(1996).
7 Steinberg, supra note 6, at 989.
8 See, e.g., text accompanying infra note 17.
9 Steinberg, supra note 6, at 1031.
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in support of a single principle of religious freedom; "religious
choice" is the only principle he identifies on which the founding generation ostensibly could have agreed amidst what he admits were substantial differences of opinion. So if it turns out that the argument is
unpersuasive and that the framers did not adopt that principle, why
must we nonetheless suppose that they adopted some other principle?
Steinberg promptly explains: we must believe this because "[c]ourts
are like ghosts-they have no life unless you believe in them. Argue
convincingly that courts are capable of only arbitrary, subjective, and
unprincipled decisions"-did I argue that?-"and that's what courts
are likely to give you." 10 We need a constitutional principle, it seems,
and so history must somehow be made to supply one.
In taking this approach to the history, Professor Steinberg is very
much in step with modern jurists and constitutional scholars. For
those who are comfortable with the genre, there will be nothing unusual or untoward about Steinberg's interweaving of historical evidence
and present need, and his overall account is likely to seem thoroughly
plausible-except, perhaps, to those who understand present need in
a very different way ("strict separationists," for example) and so would
use the historical yarn to weave quite a different pattern.
For myself, I feel some embarrassment in raising objections. I am
largely resigned to the fact that law requires this sort of history. Such
stories are perhaps just part of a necessary process by which a nation
(or at least a profession, or at least one segment of a profession) constructs a story that provides it with a sense of identity and purpose.
And I am not a strict separationist; if there is to be a principle of religious freedom, I think that Steinberg's "religious choice" principle is
at least as satisfactory as its principal competitors. That principle or
something like it has attracted the support of an array of scholars
whom I respect. 1 ' In short, I like Steinberg's story better than most of
the leading alternatives. Why not leave well enough alone?
But I also think that in an academic context-as opposed, say, to
a Fourth of July oration, or a political rally, or perhaps even ajudicial
opinion-we have the luxury of recognizing the genre for what it is.
We may even have a professional obligation to do that. So I want to
discuss how constitutional scholarship, as reflected in Professor Steinberg's essay, shapes and transforms history.
10 Id.
11 Terminology differs, of course, but I think that Thomas Berg, Edward Gaffney,
Douglas Laycock, and Michael McConnell (to mention just some leading examples)
all favor this sort of principle.
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H. JUST JURISDICrION: THE MODESTY OF THE FRAMERS
A.

1789 as of 178912

If we want to understand the "original meaning" of the religion
clauses, it is natural enough to begin by asking what the framers of
those clauses thought about religious freedom; but to begin in that
way is to go wrong from the start. The question already cuts away too
much of the context that is needed to understand what the framers
were doing. So we should begin by remembering some facts that are
mostly well known, but that in certain contexts we tend-or even
struggle-to overlook.
First, the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention had
made a self-conscious decision not to adopt a bill of rights. They
made that decision not because they were hostile to rights, but because they had deliberately settled on an entirely different strategy-a
more jurisdictional strategy-for preventing the national government
from endangering rights. More specifically, the framers insisted that
the Constitution they had drafted would create a national government
with powers limited to those actually enumerated in the text, and
13
these powers would not be sufficient to threaten basic rights anyway.
So, for example, when a proposal surfaced to include a provision protecting freedom of the press, Roger Sherman answered: "It is unnecessary. The power of Congress does not extend to the Press.' 4 And
5
most of the delegates had agreed.'
The absence of a bill of rights had been a primary object of criticism by the Constitution's opponents in the state ratification debates,
but its supporters-the Federalists-adamantly maintained that the
enumerated powers doctrine made a bill of rights unnecessary and
even dangerous.' 6 They took this position specifically with respect to
concerns about religion. Thus, Madison insisted in the Virginia convention- not, as Professor Steinberg seems to assume, after the reli12 To deflect a predictable objection, I should acknowledge that a more complete
subheading would be something like "1789 as of 1789 as of 1998." That subheading
would still be different than just "1789 as of 1998." To put the point differently, I
think there is a difference between trying to understand historical matter in its
context and presenting the matter without much regard for context, even though our
efforts in either case will necessarily be undertaken from within our context.
13

For a more careful discussion of the point, see STEVEN D. SMrrH, THE CONSTI-

TUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON

14

640 (Bicentennial ed. 1966).
See id.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).

MADISON

15
16

31-47 (1998).

NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES
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gion clauses had been drafted or adopted-that a constitutional
provision on the subject was unnecessary because "[t]here is not a
shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion." 17 In the same vein, Richard Dobbs Spaight told the North Carolina convention that "[a]s to the subject of religion... [n] o power is
given to the general government to interfere with it at all. Any act of
Congress on this subject would be a usurpation." '
Anti-Federalists remained unconvinced by this argument, in part
because they feared (with considerable prescience) that Congress
would come to exercise powers not expressly given it, perhaps under
the Necessary and Proper Clause. So some states ratified the Constitution on condition that a bill of rights be promptly added; opponents
continued to agitate for a second constitutional convention that
would draft a more satisfactory charter.' 9 Partly as a result of these
pressures, constitutionalists like Madison eventually saw the wisdom of
protecting their achievement by agreeing to put some of the desired
restrictions in writing. In particular, Madison argued that the jurisdictional limitations on national power over religion-limitations that
both Federalists and Anti-Federalists had favored but that the AntiFederalists thought insecure under the original Constitution-should
be stated explicitly.
An exchange in the House of Representatives is suggestive of
what was intended. Roger Sherman objected to any provision on the
subject of religion, insisting as he had in the Philadelphia convention
17 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof the Free Exercise of Religion, 103 H.Av. L. REv. 1409, 1477 (1990) (quoting Madison).
18

LEONARD W.

LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

RELIGION AND THE FIRsT

66 (1986) (quoting Spaight). Professor Steinberg quotes these statements and acknowledges that they may at first seem to support a jurisdictional interpretation. But he argues that the statements are subject to a different interpretation;
they might have referred to a substantive constitutional principle of religious freedom, not a jurisdictional limitation. "Madison might have meant that the federal
government could not 'intermeddle with' the religious choices of private citizens. In
other words, while colonial governments had punished individuals because they had
chosen a disfavored religion, the First Amendment prevented the federal government
from engaging in similar prosecutions." Steinberg, supranote 6, at 1004. The problem with this suggestion is that at the time Madison made the statement, the First
Amendment did not exist; indeed, Madison's statement was part of an argument contending that no substantive provision on the subject of religion was needed. In its
context, therefore, the statement clearly meant that the national government would
have no power or jurisdiction over religion.
19 See, e.g., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOcUMENTARY REcoRD FROM THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 57-62 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter DocuMENTARY REcoRD] (reporting on debate in House of Representatives over Virginia
proposal to call second constitutional convention).
AMENDMENT
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that "the amendment [is] altogether unnecessary, inasmuch as con-

gress had no authority whatever delegated to them by the constitudon, to make religious establishments .... -20 Madison did not
directly disagree, but he explained:
[W] hether the words were necessary or not he did not mean to say,
but they had been required by some of the state conventions, who
seemed to entertain an opinion that under the clause of the constitution, which gave power to congress to make all laws necessary and
proper to carry into execution the constitution, and the laws made

under it, enabled them to make laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of conscience, or establish a national religion, to
prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended,
and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of language would
admit. 2 '
One other circumstance that is usually forgotten needs to be
mentioned here. The First Congress-the Congress that drafted the
Bill of Rights-was the first Congress. It faced the daunting task of
taking care of all of the business of setting up a new government-of
creating institutions and offices, establishing ways of collecting revenue, figuring out how to run its own internal operations, and so forth.
Remembering this fact should reduce our dismay upon discovering
that Congress was loath to spend any time considering a bill of rights
at all, and was wholly unwilling to address any matters calling for serious substantive reflection and debate. 22 One representative declaimed on "the inexpediency of taking up the subject at the present
moment... while matters of the greatest importance and of immediate consequence were lying unfinished. ''23 Madison tried to mollify
such opponents by assuring them that he would offer nothing in any
way controversial-specific proposals would be limited to those that
would "meet with universal approbation"-so that the whole business
of a bill of rights might be taken care of "if congress will devote but
''24
one day to this subject.
In this context, it would have been impossible to do what modem
25
scholars sometimes castigate the First Congress for not doing; it
20

Id. at 157.

21 Id. at 157-58.
22 For a discussion of the point, see DANIEL A. FARBER
TORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 226-27, 231-34
23 DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 19, at 64.
24 Id. at 66, 77.

& SUZANNA SHERRY,

A His-

(1990).

25 Cf LEw, supra note 18, at 79.
The debate was sometimes irrelevant, usually apathetic and unclear. Ambiguity, brevity, and imprecisions in thought and expression characterize the
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would have been impossible, that is, to hold the sort of careful, deliberative conference that academicians are familiar with in order to decide upon and approve the best or truest "principle of religious
freedom." The impossibility of adopting a substantive principle on
the subject seems all the more obvious given the fact that Americans
of that generation fundamentally and passionately disagreed about
the proper relation between religion and the state. 26 Conversely, it
would have been eminently sensible simply to put in writing the jurisdictional division that all sides had agreed to from the start. Not surprisingly, that is just what Congress did.
Akhil Amar notes how this jurisdictional purpose is reflected in
the language:
The First Amendment intentionally inverted the language of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Which stated that "Congress shall have
Power To .. . make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
....
" Note how the First Amendment, which read unlike any other,
tracked and reversed this language: "Congress shall make no law ...,"

meaning that Congress simply
had no enumerated power over
27
either speech or religion.
It is understandable, of course, that we might wish the framers had
done something different. Having long since repudiated the jurisdictional arrangement that they settled on,28 we would naturally find it
more useful-and more commensurate with the solemn and immense
stature that the Bill of Rights has come to assume in our political culture-if they had deliberated and then adopted some principle of religious freedom profound enough to be worthy of the libraries of
historical and theoretical scholarship that have been devoted to
searching out its meaning and tracing out its implications.
comments of the few members who spoke. That the House understood the
debate, cared deeply about its outcome, or shared a common understanding
of the finished amendment seems doubtful.
Not even Madison himself, dutifully carrying out his pledge to secure
amendments, seems to have troubled to do more than was necessary to get
something adopted in order to satisfy the popular clamor for a bill of

rights....
Id.
26

See STEVEN D.

THE QUEST FOR A CONSTrrU19-22, 26-27 (1995). I consider Professor

SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE:

TIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOus FREEDOM

Steinberg's argument that Americans had come to agree on a principle of "religious
choice" in Part III. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
27 Akhil Reed Amar, Anti-Federalists,The Federalist Papers, and the Big Argument
for Union, 16 HAuv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 115 (1993) (footnotes omitted).

28

See

SMITH,

supra note 26, at 45-50.
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But remember for a moment that the members of the First Congress were politicians-wiser and more public-spirited than some of
that species, perhaps, but politicians nonetheless-working under unusually difficult and fragile circumstances, and faced with an immense
amount of urgent practical business. Many of them would have preferred not to consider issues such as religion at all. Their reluctance is
hardly surprising: How often do politicians rush to address difficult,
volatile issues if there is any way to avoid doing so? To be sure, the
insistence of representatives like Madison made it impossible to ignore the subject altogether. But it was possible to take care of the
issue at hand by simply reaffirming in writing a jurisdictional division
that all of the competing factions essentially agreed on. How likely is
it that in these circumstances someone would gratuitously volunteer:
"Let's not be content to solve the problem in that way. It's too easy.
Let's take the bull by the horns, figure out what the best principle of
religious freedom is, and then write that principle into the Constitution"? And what sort of response would such a proposal provoke from
harried politicians?
Like all accounts of history, the account I have just given simplifies to a degree. For one thing, despite his assurances that the Bill of
Rights would include nothing controversial, it would be hard for
someone of Madison's strong convictions not to use the opportunity
to push the content of the Constitution at least somewhat in the direction of principles he regarded as just and wise. Even while insisting
that he was doing nothing controversial, a politician would try to slip
in something for his cause, wouldn't he? And in fact Madison did try
to include in the Bill of Rights a provision dealing with religion and
other subjects that would have gone beyond merely making explicit
the jurisdictional division that all sides had agreed on. So Madison
offered a proposal that, as approved by the House, provided: "No state
shall infringe the right of trial by Jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of
conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the press." 29 He even
went so far as to say that he "[c]onceived this to be the most valuable
amendment on the whole list.... ."30 As against the objection that this
measure would interfere with the states' jurisdiction, Madison's insistence was enough to overcome opposition in the House-but not in
the Senate, where the proposal was deleted from the Bill of Rights,
never to be revived. 31 We cannot know exactly why this more-thanFederalist measure was defeated-any Senate debates on the subject
29
30
31

DocuMENTARY RECORD, supra note 19, at 41 (emphasis added).
Id. at 188.
See id. at 41, 188-89.
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were not reported-but the decision was at least entirely consistent
with a jurisdictional interpretation of the First Amendment.
B.

ProfessorSteinberg's Objections

1. Did Congress Have Jurisdiction over Religion?
Professor Steinberg objects to this jurisdictional interpretation by
insisting that Congress did have some jurisdiction over religion, and
that Congress could not have assigned all jurisdiction over religion to
the states. He gives the example of a draft law, which would affect
religious pacifists like Quakers either if they were exempted from military service or if they were not exempted.3 2 From this observation,
Steinberg draws two important implications. First, while agreeing that
the First Congress intended to leave the status quo undisturbed (and
that the paucity of debate reflects this intention), Steinberg argues
that the status quo was one in which Congress had some jurisdiction
over religion. 33 Second, Steinberg suggests (if I understand his argument correctly) that we cannot attribute to the framers an intention
to do something that could not be done.
Professor Steinberg's premise is right, I think, but his argument is
with Madison and the Federalists, not with me. His premise asserts, in
essence, that the national government had power that the Federalists
repeatedly said it did not have, and that the Constitution could not
have done what Madison and the Federalists repeatedly said it did do.
More specifically, the Constitution could not carefully confine the national government under the enumerated powers doctrine because
that government would inevitably exercise implied powers, and these
implied powers could not be contained by the enumerated powers
strategy. The Anti-Federalists had argued this all along, of course, and
in retrospect it seems clear that they were right 34 (although the struggle to make the enumerated powers doctrine work continues 3 5).
The crucial fact, however, is that Madison and his allies repeatedly said that the national government had no power over religion
and, more generally, that the enumerated powers strategy would contain national jurisdiction. In saying this they may well have been
3' 6
guilty, as Leonard Levy argues, of "a colossal error of judgment.
But right or wrong, this was their premise in defending the original
32 See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 1005.
33 See id. at 1003-04.
34 The difficulty is discussed at length in SMITH, supra note 13, at 48-69.
35 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
36 LEONARD W. LEVY, CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECTS OF THE BiLL OF RIGHTS
113 (1986).
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Constitution, and it was the premise that they sought to shore up and
explicitly affirm in the First Amendment. Steinberg's argument seems
to assume that since the framers' announced and vociferously defended jurisdictional strategy was destined to prove ineffectual (as we
can see with benefit of hindsight), it is permissible not only for us to
adopt a different strategy more oriented to substantive individual
rights (as we have done), but it is also permissible for us to attribute a
different strategy to them. This assumption would seem extraordinary
outside the special genre of constitutional history.
This analysis should probably be qualified in two ways. First, I
hasten to note that Madison was not nearly as naive as my discussion
to this point may imply. He expressed cogent doubts about the efficacy of the enumerated powers strategy during the Constitutional
Convention, during the ratification debates, and afterwards. Indeed,
Madison understood that any merely human contrivance to limit government and direct history was problematic at best.37 Despite these

misgivings, however, he placed his money, so to speak, on that strategy-and on the general dynamics of a large pluralistic society-as
8
the best way of protecting rights.A
Second, there is indeed room to wonder whether the First Congress actually believed that all jurisdiction over religion rested with
the states, with or without the First Amendment. As noted, much of
the talk ("not a shadow of right" to "meddle with religion") was to that
effect. But perhaps Congress at least vaguely understood that relinquishing jurisdiction to effect an "establishment of religion" or to prohibit the "free exercise" of it was not precisely equivalent to
foreswearing all power over religion itself. At one point the House
approved a version of the amendment offered by Samuel Livermore
that would have provided that "congress shall make no laws touching
religion, or infringing the rights of conscience."3 9 This wording probably sounds to us like a total renunciation of jurisdiction over the subject. So the House's later decision to abandon Livermore's version in
favor of what seems less sweeping language might indicate a decision
to enact only a partial renunciation.
We have to be cautious in our inferences here, I think, because
the House was plainly not in a mood to be finicky over language or to
40
provide any lengthy explanations of the wording it ultimately chose.
37
38
39
40
them

See TiH FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison).
For a lengthier discussion, see SmrrH, supra note 13, at 65-69.
DocUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 19, at 158 (emphasis added).
Even in offering his proposal Livermore emphasized that "he did not wish
to dwell long on the subject." Id. at 158.
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Even if Livermore's language had been retained, it seems quite possible that the Congress would have dismissed the sort of concerns
raised by Professor Steinberg with impatience: "It is true that we have
no power over religion, but that doesn't mean that we have to draft
Quakers-or that we can'tdraft Quakers. A draft law is a draft law, not
a law 'touching religion."' In any case, the language finally adopted
does not expressly say that Congress relinquished all power over religion, but only the power to make laws "respecting an establishment of
41
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
The crucial point, though, is that a partial renunciation of jurisdiction is no less jurisdictional in character-and no more an enactment of a substantive principle or right-than a total renunciation of
jurisdiction. So for present purposes nothing hinges on the perhaps
undecidable question of whether Congress meant to relinquish literally all or only "practically all" jurisdiction over religion to the states.
Professor Steinberg seems impatient with this suggestion; he observes
that the meaning or scope of a partial renunciation would be uncertain. 42 There seems little to say here except that of course Professor
Steinberg is right: a partial renunciation ofjurisdiction, like any other
enactment (jurisdictional or otherwise), might be uncertain, and it almost surely would require construction. 4 3 Steinberg seems to suppose
that since a partial renunciation of jurisdiction might be inconveniently uncertain in its scope, we are therefore entitled to treat it as
other than jurisdictional. It is hard to perceive the warrant for that
sort of transformation outside-or perhaps even within-the special
genre of constitutional history.
2.

The Substantive Content of the Religion Clauses

Professor Steinberg also argues, with citations to dictionaries of
the time, that the words of the religion clauses had substantive content and imposed substantive limitations on the national government.
Again, Steinberg is right, but again his argument seems beside the
point. Any disclaimer of jurisdiction will necessarily have substantive
41 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
42 See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 1006 ("I'm not entirely certain what Professor
Smith means by the phrase 'partial renunciation ofjurisdiction.'").
43 Realistically, one might doubt whether it is ever accurate to describe a provision as a total renunciation ofjurisdiction. Taken very literally, wouldn't this phrase
imply that a government was simply dissolving itself? Even a total renunciation of
jurisdiction over a particularsubject is in a practical sense a partial renunciation that
obviously might require construction.
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content and will impose substantive limitations. 44 For example, a statute denying the federal courts jurisdiction over a certain category of
cases-cases defined by subject matter or amount in controversy, for
example-will have to use substantive terms to define which cases the
courts are not supposed to adjudicate. But there is a difference between denying jurisdiction over a substantive area and imposing a substantive principle or creating a substantive right restricting government
in an area in which it admittedly has jurisdiction. In the judicial context, for example, the first sort of limit is said to mean that a court has
no power to hear a case or to reach "the merits," while the second sort
of limit guides the court in evaluating the merits. In the First Amendment context, consequently, efforts to discern the substantive meanings of phrases like "establishment of religion" or "free exercise [of
religion]" are interesting but not germane to the issue here. The
question, once again, is not whether the religion clauses had substantive content-they did, necessarily-but whether they were intended
merely to deny the federal government jurisdiction over a substantive
area or, instead, affirmatively to adopt a substantive principle of religious freedom. And the phrase in the text relevant to that disputeand indicative of Congress' jurisdictional purpose-is "Congress shall
make no law ....

-45

In sum, if we consider the matter while keeping in view the context and constraints of the time, it appears that Congress did not need
to, would have been unable to, and did not do more than explicitly
reaffirm a jurisdictional division that all sides had accepted. The
words that Professor Steinberg focuses on-"establishment of religion," "free exercise"-served to define the substantive area over
which Congress was disclaiming jurisdiction. The substantive content
of those words does nothing to show that Congress' purpose was more
than jurisdictional.
Having said this, though, I must also acknowledge two important
facts. First, although lawyers routinely distinguish between jurisdictional limits and more purely substantive ones, or between rules regulating jurisdiction and rules "on the merits," the distinction can
sometimes be a slippery one. So there is always a risk that a jurisdictional rule might dissolve into a more purely substantive one. Second,
the framers of the First Amendment did not actually use the words
44 The issue is discussed at some length in ForeordainedFailureunder the heading

of "The Substance of the Religion Clauses' Federalism." See Smrm, supra note 26, at
22-26.
45

If the modem Supreme Court had embraced a jurisdictional construction of

the First Amendment, arguments like the ones Steinberg makes here would of course
be relevant to the issue ofjust what the denial ofjurisdiction encompassed.
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"no jurisdiction." To be sure, they used other words-"shall make no
law"-that in the context seem to have meant the same thing. There
is nothing mandatory or magic about the word 'Jurisdiction." Still, divorced from the context and the enactors' intentions, the words actually employed are capable of supporting a different constructionone more amenable to our needs and purposes.
These two concessions are perfectly consistent with a jurisdictional interpretation of what the religion clauses meant to those who
adopted them. But within the genre of constitutional scholarship,
they also give the modern constitutional scholar or jurist all he needs
to undertake a major remodeling of the amendment.
III.

REMODELING THE RELIGION CLAUSES:

THE

"RELIGIOUS CHOICE" PRINCIPLE

A principal argument for the jurisdictional construction is that at
the time of the First Congress, Americans disagreed at a fundamental
level about the proper relation between government and religion.
Most citizens believed-as their predecessors had done for centuries-that a political community needs a religious base. But some citizens continued to hold the traditional view that government should
protect this religious base by affirmatively supporting and reinforcing
an approved religion in a variety of ways-monetary subsidies, laws
prohibiting blasphemy and Sabbath-breaking, exclusion of the religiously heterodox from public office-while others believed religion
could and would flourish better without state support. I cited this disagreement as one reason why the First Congress could not have
46
adopted a substantive principle of religious freedom.
Professor Steinberg makes this claim a focal point of his response.
He concedes that considerable disagreement persisted, but he also argues that at about the time of the Revolutionary War Americans generally came to accept a principle-he calls it the principle of
"religious choice"-that had previously been controversial. Steinberg
believes that the First Congress could have coalesced around this principle. Indeed, he says that Congress did adopt the principlealthough I see no evidence in his book review indicating that members of Congress understood themselves to have done this.
Even so, if Steinberg is right that Americans of the time-and
hence Congress- could have agreed on a "religious choice" principle,
that would be an important fact. It would at least increase the likelihood that members of Congress did consciously decide to incorporate
46

See

SMITH,

supra note 26, at 19-22, 26-27.
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this principle into the Constitution, even if they neglected to say so in
any explicit way. Perhaps more importantly, within the special genre
of constitutional history, "could havd' might be good enough. Even in
nonconstitutional contexts, scholars and judges occasionally advocate
"imaginative reconstruction" as a proper interpretive technique: what
would the legislature have decided if it had addressed a particular
question?47 So perhaps the appropriate question in this context
should go something like this: if the First Amendment's framers had
had the time and inclination to adopt some sort of principle of religious freedom, what would that principle have been? If Steinberg is
right that Americans of that time had come to embrace a principle of
"religious choice," then that principle would have been an attractive
possibility.
But did Americans in the founding period agree on this principle? If we look at our early history in distant, broad-brush terms, we
surely sense a general trend toward greater acceptance of religious
pluralism, or toward greater "toleration of private religious choices."4 8
Professor Steinberg's argument rides on this sense of historical movement. Thus, he recounts instances of severe religious persecution in
the seventeenth century (Puritans executed Quakers and jailed or expelled Baptists); but the persecution became milder as independence
approached (Baptists were jailed but not executed or expelled in Virginia), and in the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods
nearly all states adopted "freedom of conscience" or "free exercise"
provisions as part of their state constitutions.
So does this development add up to general acceptance of the
"principle" of "religious choice"? Before embracing this pleasing conclusion, we first should notice some contrary evidence-evidence that
might seem overwhelming to an investigator with a different purpose
(say, a critic inclined to portray the American political system as a
product and expression of oppressive "Eurocentric" tendencies) but
that the constitutional scholar has a neat way of deflecting. The contrary evidence, of course, is that well into the nineteenth century a
number of states continued to impose various legal sanctions on deviant religious beliefs and practices. States still prosecuted people for
blasphemy. They still excluded non-Christians, or non-Protestants,
from serving in public office. They still compelled citizens by law to
contribute money to churches. 49 If such practices occurred today, we
47

See WILLAM N.

LEGISLATION

48
49

ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP

526 (2d ed. 1995).

Steinberg, supra note 6, at 1021.
See SMrrH, supra note 26, at 37-39.

P.

FRiCKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

1048

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEWV

[VOL- 74:3

would surely regard them as gross violations of any commitment to
"religious choice." Steinberg acknowledges the persistence of these
"outdated and repressive practices." 50 So then how can he say that by
the post-Revolutionary period, Americans almost universally had
come to embrace a principle of "religious choice"?
Part of the answer, it seems, is that the trend, or the movement of
history, was away from these restrictions on religious choice. In this
vein, Professor Steinberg notes that in 1758 nine states still taxed citizens to support religious establishments, but by 1789 only four of
those states imposed such taxes, and within less than half-a-century
the last of such assessments would be abandoned.5 1 I assume that
Steinberg accurately reports these facts. We know these things now.
But why these facts counts as an argument about what nearly all Americans ostensibly agreed to (or could have agreed to) in 1789 remains a
bit mysterious. The presence of arguments of this kind shows, I think,
that we are working with a special genre of scholarship.
The more important part of Professor Steinberg's argument,
however, rests on the special quality of a constitutional "principle." In
constitutional discourse, a "principle" is a wonderfully elastic thing. It
can be squeezed small, taking on a size and shape that we can imagine-sufferable to some previous generation of framers; then, once
attached to the Constitution, the principle can be stretched almost
indefinitely to support a range of conclusions that may go beyond,
and even contradict, any specific judgments consciously held by the
original enactors. 52 Virtually all constitutional scholars-"conservatives" and "liberals," "originalists" and "nonoriginalists"-use principles in this way. The pervasiveness of this practice makes it seem not
only possible but indeed thoroughly unremarkable for Steinberg to
say that Americans in the founding period agreed on a principle that
is still very useful and appealing to us, even though their specific notions about how government should treat religion plainly differed radically in many particulars from currently prevailing ideas.
As I understand it, the "religious choice" principle that nearly all
Americans of the late 1700s are said to have embraced basically held
that people should not be punished merely for holding unpopularor heret50 Steinberg, supra note 6, at 1020.
51 See id. at 999-1000.
52 Just what sort of thing a constitutional principle is, so as to have these valuable
properties, is conveniently unclear. In fact, the practical usefulness of constitutional
principles is wholly dependent on their enigmatic ontology. See Steven D. Smith, Idolaty in ConstitutionalInterpretation, in PAUL F. CAMPOS ET AL., AGAINST THE LAW 157,
180-86 (1996).
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ical religious beliefs, or for acting on those beliefs in private.53 Dissenters might be punished for expressing these beliefs in a way likely to
cause civil disturbance, as in the blasphemy prosecutions. And the
heterodox might suffer deprivations for belief alone in the sense that
they could be excluded from serving in public office. But they could
not be punished criminally merely for the belief. By describing the
"religious choice" principle in these somewhat pinched terms, Professor Steinberg seeks to reconcile it with the apparently contrary behavior of the period-blasphemy prosecutions, religious oath
requirements, and so forth. Once the principle achieves constitutional status, of course, such unfortunate applications or "conceptions" can be discarded; indeed, these practices disappear entirely
when Steinberg discusses the contemporary meaning of "religious
choice."
Having thus sliced and shaped the principle, we can ask the question again: would Americans of the founding period generally have
accepted a "religious choice" principle if it were defined in this carefully restricted way? Would they have agreed, in other words, that religious dissenters should not be punished just for their private beliefs so
long as they did not publicly express or act on those beliefs in objectionable ways? Although there was no George Gallup putting the
question to citizens in this form, I believe along with Professor Steinberg that Americans would have said "Amen" to this proposition. But
then I also suspect that most Americans a century or a century-and-ahalf earlier would likewise have endorsed the proposition. Indeed, I
do not believe that this proposition was ever seriously contested in this
country. Even in the community that has come to serve as a symbol of
stuffy religious intolerance-the Massachusetts Bay colony of John
Winthrop and John Cotton-the authorities do not seem to have believed that people should be punished justfor believing something that
was regarded as unorthodox or deviant. Timothy Hall's recent study
indicates that the Puritans punished dissenters like Quakers and Baptists only because and only when their views and actions were seen as a
54
threat to public peace and order.
The Puritans' focus on the public consequences of religious error
rather than on the innate perniciousness of that error resulted in
53 See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 1001 ("Simply put, Americans agreed that it was
improper to outlaw a religion, or to punish believers on account of their private religious choices with imprisonment or banishment.").
54 See TimoTH L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WI.LIAMS AND
RELIGIOUS LmERT" 58-62 (1998). I discuss Hall's interpretation at greater length in
Steven D. Smith, Separation and the Fanatic (forthcoming Book Review in the 1999
Virginia Law Review).
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their generally leaving religious error undisturbed so long as it kept
its head low. They launched no inquisition to ferret out heresy
from its hiding places in the hearts of Massachusettes inhabitants.
Puritans, John Cotton said, had learned the virtue of meekness,
which required them to "suffer one another in differences and
weakness." The weight of civil authority only came to bear upon
deviations from orthodoxy when those deviations took a public
form .... 55
Of course, notions of community-and hence of what counts as a
threat to the peace of the community-change over time. The Puritans were more prone than, say, we are to regard religious dissent as a
threat to community; their attitude reflected a view of community that
was both religious and "republican" in character. 5 6 As our conception
of community has grown both more secular and more liberal or individualistic, religion may increasingly come to seem irrelevant to civil
or public concerns. 57 But the bare proposition that people should be
permitted to believe whatever they choose or feel compelled to believe so long as they do not injure public peace and order is one that
almost everyone at all points in our history-Roger Williams andJohn
Cotton, Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry, the ACLU and the
Christian Coalition-might cheerfully endorse.
In reaching this conclusion, have I inadvertently undermined my
own position by conceding that Americans of the founding generation could have concurred in approving a "principle of religious
choice"? By my account, of course, Professor Steinberg is mistaken in
supposing that, as he says repeatedly, the convergence on this principle represented a significant change from the pre-Revolutionary climate of opinion. But perhaps Steinberg does not need to make that
claim. Why does he need to ascribe unenlightened views to the Puritans in order to assign enlightened views to the Founders? Shouldn't
it be sufficient for his purposes to say that the founding generation
did accept the principle? Isn't that agreement enough to get the principle on board the Constitution?
The answers to these questions turn, I think, on the same old
matter of genre. For one thing, much in the way that a good novel
will not have characters doing things without discernible motives, a
55 HALL, supra note 54, at 61 (footnote omitted).
56 Hall's discussion of the point is illuminating. See id. at 48-64.
57 Of course, these conceptions of community and harm and the relevance of
religion continue to be contested. The role of religion in the public order has generated a vast literature over the last decade or so. See, e.g., RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY
LIBERALISM (PaulJ. Weithman ed., 1997); KENTa GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVIcTIONS
AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
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good constitutional story needs to supply some reason why legislators
and "the People" would undertake at some particular point in time to
write a particular provision or principle into the Constitution. Consequently, a story that depicts people as writing newly discovered principles into the Constitution is more appealing than a story that shows
them suddenly constitutionalizing ideas that had gone uncontested
for generations. Why legalize what no one would want to challenge?
So it makes sense that we would adopt a constitutional provision guaranteeing that women can vote because it had long been supposed that
they couldn't. But we would be surprised at a proposal to ensure that
left-handed people can vote: the principle is sound enough, and we
could agree to adopt it, but since no one ever doubted it there seems
no reason to engraft it onto the Constitution. In the same way, Steinberg's account, in which Americans decided to constitutionalize a
newly accepted (and perhaps still vulnerable) principle of religious
choice, makes for a better story than one in which Americans decided
to add to the Constitution a principle that had largely been taken for
granted from the nation's inception.
In addition, although we are perfectly used to ascribing to constitutional principles a magisterial generality that might have astonished
the principle's enactors, there are also tacit limits on our ascent up
the ladder of increasing generality. The limits are not so much a function of the historical evidence-a very general principle might be no
more foreign to any actual, conscious "framers' intentions" than a less
general principle would be-but rather are implicit in the genre itself.
That is because as a principle becomes more and more open-ended,
the dubious nature of the whole enterprise becomes more
conspicuous.
Familiarity normally lets us forget that there is after all something
very odd about a political system in which constitutional "principles"
adopted by one group of people (who may only dimly perceive the
meaning or scope of those principles, or who may not quite realize
that they are enacting "principles" at all) 5 8 come to be revered as

supreme, judicially enforceable law. The consequence is that, generations later, a small body of unelected officials will have power to override the decisions of more democratic branches on the theory that
these decisions somehow offend the reigning "principles" (which by
now may have picked up meanings radically different than anything
contemplated by their unwitting enactors). Such a system is odd, I
say; but the oddity is highlighted when the principles are highly general or open-ended. Thus, we have become accustomed to supposing
58

See SMrru, supra note 13, at 31-47, 79-80.
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that there is something like a "principle of free speech" that courts
properly enforce, even though their decisions might have surprised
the people who approved the First Amendment. But we would find it
embarrassing or unacceptable to say that some constitutional provision embodies the "principle of general fairness" or the "principle of
good sense," thereby authorizing courts to strike down any law that
they regard as unfair or not good sense. At that point, the oddity of a
system based on constitutional principles would become just too glaring. What sense would it make to have a political system that works in
this way?
So a story about religious freedom needs to culminate in a principle that is broad enough to do what we need with it but not so general
that it starts to look like a "principle of good sense." At first glance, a
"principle of religious choice" probably seems safe enough. But if we
were to concede that this principle has been accepted by nearly everyone throughout our nation's history, and that people have thought
the principle fully compatible with a variety of measures (executing
Quakers, prosecuting blasphemers) that we would now regard as reprehensible, that principle comes to seem more suspect-and much
more open-ended than it at first appeared. It comes perilously close
to being a "'treat religion appropriately in light of prevailing assumptions and values' principle." Why would we want to give judges that
sort of blank check? Conversely, describing the principle as something that Americans only came to accept in the post-Revolutionary
period (and that even then they only vaguely understood) is a way of
paring the principle down so that it can serve nicely as the motif of an
appealing constitutional story.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In my view, the "r*eligious choice" story told by Professor Steinberg (and by many others) is an imposition on our history: it flattens
and it simultaneously domesticates and ennobles a set of developments that were in fact complex, messy, and erratic, and that were not
understood by the participants in the terms that modern constitutional storytellers use.
In the end, though, I'm not eager to oppose the story for general
or public purposes. It's a pretty good story. The historical materials
are there to make it acceptable, at least under the special standards of
the genre of constitutional scholarship. This is to say that in a rough
sense our history has moved towards greater acceptance of religious
pluralism, and that the words of the First Amendment can be read to
refer to a principle of religious choice. For constitutional purposes,

1999]

RELIGION

CLAUSES

IN

CONSTITUTIONAL

SCHOLARSHIP

1053

that is probably enough. If we must have a constitutional principle of
religious freedom, "religious choice" seems at least as appealing as the
other leading candidates. And if the "religious choice" principle is
one we might want to adopt anyway, then what harm can it do to give
that principle a narrative pedigree?
Still, at least in an academic context, I think we might acknowledge one thing: if we choose to tell this story, it will gain its power
more from our needs and desires than from anything thrust upon us
by the events and decisions of 1789.
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IN MEMORIAM

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.-A TRIBUTE
The HonorableKenneth F. Ripple*
In remembering Justice Powell, my memory invariably recalls
three distinct images from the years I spent at the Supreme Court.
Two of these memories are from my own work with him. The other is
from my observation of him on the bench. In the days since his death
this past autumn, all three have sparked a great deal of reflection
about his enduring contribution to our jurisprudence and to our
profession.
During my first year at the Court, I presented matters that came
before him in his capacity as CircuitJustice for the Fifth Circuit. Busy
Justices rarely find applications for interlocutory relief to be a welcome interruption from their regular fare. Circuit work usually comes
to the Court on little or no record and the Justices are asked, on short
notice, to intervene, sometimes in very definitive ways, in cases about
which they have only a modicum of information. This situation is a
very uncomfortable one for a Justice habituated to the rhythm of appellate decisionmaking in the rarified atmosphere of the Supreme
Court. Although he obviously had a great deal of other work to do,
Justice Powell always approached his circuit work in a calm unruffled
manner. On the occasions when he requested an oral briefing, his
attention was riveted totally on what I had to say; his eyes would never
show the slightest hint of distraction as, rocking gently in his desk
chair, he listened intently. I cannot recall his ever having interrupted
my initial presentation, but as his questions and discussion afterward
invariably would evidence, his mind had not only grasped but sifted
the facts and the law in search of the essence of the case as I spoke.
His decisionmaking was methodical, low key, dispassionate. His grasp
of complex factual situations and even more complex regulatory
schemes was quick and surefooted. He demonstrated particular care
in ensuring that both sides of the matter were fully aired. When he
*

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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had made his decision, I could count on precise instructions as to the
disposition. His demeanor in the privacy of his chambers was not at
all dissimilar from that one observed when he was on the bench. In
the courtroom, he rarely interrupted counsel, but the intensity of his
attention evinced an intellect hard at work. His questions usually
came at the end of the argument. Posed in the most polite manner
possible, they nevertheless were aimed invariably at the heart of the
case.
The second vivid image that inevitably comes to mind whenever I
think of the Justice is based on a single encounter one Saturday evening. Having worked all day in my office on the Court's second floor,
I set out for home around the dinner hour. The elevator stopped on
the first floor, where the Justices had their chambers, andJustice Powell stepped on. He looked tired, very tired. His tie was loosened and
he was carrying two large brief cases. Here was one of America's most
accomplished lawyers, then in his late sixties, going home for the
weekend at six o'clock on a Saturday night after what had obviously
been a very full day at the office.
Lastly, I remember him on the bench. During my years at the
Court, he sat next to Justice Marshall and the two would do a good
deal of low-key talking throughout the oral argument session: two Justices whose paths to the Court had been so different sharing the ultimate responsibility of interpreting the Constitution.
When Justice Powell left us several months ago, the commentators and "talking heads" of the electronic media gave us their "soundbite" assessment of his career as aJustice. He was described as "scholarly," "courtly," and a "Southern gentleman." In some quarters, it was
suggested that he was a person of an earlier and quainter time; others
suggested that his jurisprudential contribution might not endure because he had not been the leader of an ideological bloc. For me, the
memories contained in the three images I have just recounted suggest
another and far more positive perspective.
Whether based on a meeting in the privacy of his chambers or in
the formal setting of the courtroom, a lawyer left an encounter with
Justice Powell with the same dominant impression: the morality of his
mind. In every professional situation, great or small, the classical
characteristics of the thoughtful judge dominated the process of decision: the precise dissection of the facts, the structured discussion of
the law, the care in ensuring that no stone, factual or legal, was left
unturned, the deliberate suspension ofjudgment until the entire case

